

APPENDICES

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Appendix A

THE EUROPEAN GAS NETWORK

OTHER LICENSED BLOCKS GRANTED FOR EXPLORATION BEFORE 2003

IRISH WATER BLOCKS INCLUDING EXPLORATION BASINS


2003/2004 ADDITIONAL LICENSING INITIATIVES AT THE PORCUPINE BASIN

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


Source : Eurogas

The European Gas Network (Corrib Gas can be transported to Africa and Russia)




Other Licenced Blocks Already Granted For Exploration Before 2003



Source (Petroleum Affairs Division) www.PAD.ie
Irish Water Blocks including Exploration Basins

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Source (Petroleum Affairs Division) www.PAD.ie
2003/2004 Additional Licensing Initiatives at The Porcupine Basin

Appendix B

EXTRACTS FROM THE

SEVESO II DIRECTIVE (96/82/EC)

EU GAS DIRECTIVE

Foreshore Act

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Seveso II Directive [96/82/EC]

Article 1

Aim

This Directive is aimed at the prevention of major accidents which involve dangerous substances, and the limitation of their consequences for man and the environment, with a view to ensuring high levels of protection throughout the Community in a consistent and effective manner.

Article 2

Scope

1. The Directive shall apply to establishments where dangerous substances are present in quantities equal to or in excess of the quantities listed in Annex I, Parts 1 and 2, column 2, with the exception of Articles 9, 11 and 13 which shall apply to any establishment where dangerous substances are present in quantities equal to or in excess of the quantities listed in Annex I, Parts 1 and 2, column 3.

For the purposes of this Directive, the 'presence of dangerous substances' shall mean the actual or anticipated presence of such substances in the establishment, or the presence of those which it is believed may be generated during loss of control of an industrial chemical process, in quantities equal to or in excess of the thresholds in Parts I and 2 of Annex I.

2. The provisions of this Directive shall apply without prejudice to Community provisions concerning the working environment, and, in particular, without prejudice to Council Directive 89/391/EEC of 12 June 1989 on the introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and health of workers at work⁽¹⁾.

Article 3

Definitions

For the purposes of this Directive:

1. 'establishment' shall mean the whole area under the control of an operator where dangerous substances are present in one or more installations, including common or related infrastructures or activities;
2. 'installation' shall mean a technical unit within an establishment in which dangerous substances are produced, used, handled or stored. It shall include all the equipment, structures, pipework, machinery, tools, private railway sidings, docks, unloading quays serving the installation, jetties, warehouses or similar structures, floating or otherwise, necessary for the operation of the installation;

3. 'operator' shall mean any individual or corporate body who operates or holds an establishment or installation or, if provided for by national legislation, has been given decisive economic power in the technical operation thereof;
4. 'dangerous substance' shall mean a substance, mixture or preparation listed in Annex 1, Part 1, or fulfilling the criteria laid down in Annex 1, Part 2, and present as a raw material, product, by-product, residue or intermediate, including those substances which it is reasonable to suppose may be generated in the event of accident;
5. 'major accident' shall mean an occurrence such as a major emission, fire, or explosion resulting from uncontrolled developments in the course of the operation of any establishment covered by this Directive, and leading to serious danger to human health and/or the environment, immediate or delayed, inside or outside the establishment, and involving one or more dangerous substances;
6. 'hazard' shall mean the intrinsic property of a dangerous substance or physical situation, with a potential for creating damage to human health and/or the environment;
7. 'risk' shall mean the likelihood of a specific effect occurring within a specified period or in specified circumstances;
8. 'storage' shall mean the presence of a quantity of dangerous substances for the purposes of warehousing, depositing in safe custody or keeping in stock.

Article 4

Exclusions

This Directive shall not apply to the following:

- a. military establishments, installations or storage facilities;
- b. hazards created by ionizing radiation;
- c. the transport of dangerous substances and intermediate temporary storage by road, rail, internal waterways, sea or air outside the establishments covered by this Directive, including loading and unloading and transport to and from another means of transport at docks, wharves or marshalling yards;
- d. **the transport of dangerous substances in pipelines, including pumping stations, outside establishments covered by this Directive;**
- e. the activities of the extractive industries concerned with exploration for, and the exploitation of, minerals in mines and quarries or by means of boreholes;
- f. waste land-fill sites.

Article 12

Land-use planning

1. Member States shall ensure that the objectives of preventing major accidents and limiting the consequences of such accidents are taken into account in their land use policies and/or other relevant policies. They shall pursue those objectives through controls on :

- a. the siting of new establishments,
- b. modifications to existing establishments covered by Article 10,
- c. new developments such as transport links, locations frequented by the public and residential areas in the vicinity of existing establishments, where the siting or developments are such as to increase the risk or consequences of a major accident.

Member States shall ensure that their land-use and/or other relevant policies and the procedures for implementing those policies take account of the need, in the long term, to maintain appropriate

distances between establishments covered by this Directive and residential areas, areas of public use and areas of particular natural sensitivity or interest, and, in the case of existing establishments, of the need for additional technical measures in accordance with Article 5 so as not to increase the risks to people.

2. Member States shall ensure that all competent authorities and planning authorities responsible for decisions in this area set up appropriate consultation procedures to facilitate implementation of the policies established under paragraph 1. The procedures shall be designed to ensure that technical advice on the risks arising from the establishment is available, either on a case-by-case or on a generic basis, when decisions are taken.

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EU Gas Directive 98/30/EC

SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS

Article 1

This Directive establishes common rules for the transmission, distribution, supply and storage of natural gas. It lays down the rules relating to the organisation and functioning of the natural gas sector, including liquefied natural gas (LNG), access to the market, the operation of systems, and the criteria and procedures applicable to the granting of authorisations for transmission, distribution, supply and storage of natural gas.

Article 2

For the purposes of this Directive:

1. 'natural gas undertaking' means any natural or legal person carrying out at least one of the following functions: production, transmission, distribution, supply, purchase or storage of natural gas, including LNG, which is responsible for the commercial, technical and/or maintenance tasks related to those functions, but shall not include final customers;

2. 'upstream pipeline network' means any pipeline or network of pipelines operated and/or constructed as part of an oil or gas production project, or used to convey natural gas from one or more such projects to a processing plant or terminal or **final coastal landing terminal**;

DISTRIBUTION AND SUPPLY

Article 9

1. Member States shall ensure that distribution undertakings act in accordance with Articles 10 and 11.

2. Member States may impose distribution undertakings **and/or supply undertakings, an obligation to deliver to customers located in a given area or of a certain class or both. The tariff for such deliveries may be regulated, for instance to ensure equal treatment of the customers concerned.**

Extracts from Foreshore Act 1933

Section 3

Power for Minister to grant licences of foreshore.

3.—(1) If, in the opinion of the Minister, it is in the public interest that a licence should be granted to any person in respect of any foreshore belonging to Saorstát Éireann authorising such person to place any material or to place or erect any articles, things, structures, or works in or on such foreshore, to remove any beach material from such foreshore, to get and take any minerals in such foreshore and not more than thirty feet below the surface thereof, or to use or occupy such foreshore for any purpose, the Minister may, subject to the provisions of this Act, grant by deed under his official seal such licence to such person for such term not exceeding ninety-nine years commencing at or before the date of such licence, as the Minister shall think proper.

(2) Every licence granted under this section shall (unless the Minister is of opinion that such licence should in the public interest be granted free of any payment) be granted subject to the payment to the Minister of such moneys, whether by way of fine or other preliminary payment or by way of rent or other periodical payment or by way of royalty on material removed or by all or any of such ways, as the Minister shall think proper and shall agree upon with the person to whom such licence is granted.

(3) Where, in the opinion of the Minister, a licence proposed to be granted under this section is, owing to its nature, duration, or otherwise, of a trivial character and should be granted without payment or subject to a nominal payment only, such licence may, notwithstanding anything contained in this section, be granted by way of permission in writing signed by the Minister or one of the principal officers of his Department.

(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, no licence requiring payment by the licensee of a rent or other annual payment exceeding ten pounds a year shall be granted under this section without the sanction of the Minister for Finance.

(5) Every licence granted under this section shall contain a power to the Minister to terminate such licence on breach, non-performance, or non-observance by the licensee of any covenant on the licensee's part (including a covenant for payment of rent, royalty or other money), condition or agreement contained therein.

(6) No licence granted under this section shall contain any covenant or agreement for the renewal of such licence.

(7) Every licence granted under this section shall (subject to the provisions of this section) contain such covenants, conditions, and agreements as the Minister shall consider proper or desirable in the public interest and shall agree upon with the person to whom such licence is granted.

(8) No licence granted under this section shall extend to or authorise the removal of any minerals lying more than thirty feet below the surface of the foreshore to which such licence relates.

(9) Whenever an application is made to the Minister for the grant of a licence under this section, the Minister may, if he thinks fit, hold a public inquiry in regard to the granting of such licence.

Appendix C

News Extracts Of Recent Gas Explosions.

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Last Update: Monday, December 29, 2003.
8:24am (AEDT)
Death toll from China Gas Blast jumps to 233

The death toll from a natural gas well blowout in south-west China has climbed to 233 as rescue workers began cleaning up a vast "death zone", the official Xinhua news agency said.

Medical workers were disinfecting eight villages, testing drinking water and poisoned crops near the site of the leak, a gas field in Chongqing municipality, Zhang Mingkui, director of the Kaixian County Bureau of Environmental Protection, said.

About **42,000 people** were evacuated after the blow-out on Tuesday. Some began returning home over the weekend.

Newspapers and Internet portals showed pictures of villagers in trucks on their way home but locals, whose houses lie within five kilometres of the leak, were not allowed to return.

"I want to clean up my house and count my losses because we can't smell the fumes now," Xinhua quoted a farmer as saying.

The cloud of gas swept across a **25 square kilometre** area on Tuesday, **devastating villages and poisoning farms**. More bodies were found in mountain villages on Sunday, pushing the death toll up by 35. About 1,000 workers were clearing away almost 4,000 animals, including cattle, pigs, rabbits, ducks, chickens and dogs, killed by the gas well burst, Xinhua said.

The Ministry of Civil Affairs has sent 10,000 quilts and 300 tonnes of food and medicine to the victims. Workers poured hundreds of cubic metres of mud and cement into the 400-metre-deep well in Kaixian county on Saturday, plugging a mix of natural gas and sulphurated hydrogen that caused acid burns to the eyes, skin and lungs of victims.

A total of 10,175 people were either hospitalised or treated and discharged. Nearly 80 people were in serious condition.

State-run China National Petroleum Corp, which operates the gas field and parent of listed oil major Petrochina, will pay compensation to villagers, state television quoted company vice president Su Shulin as saying.

Xinhua did not say how the latest deaths occurred, but many of those injured reported suffered gas poisoning and skins burns from exposure to the fumes.

Jan 5 2004

The death toll from a gas-drilling accident that spewed toxic fumes over villages in south western China rose to 243 today, after 10 injured people died in hospital.

An additional 396 people were still being treated following the December 23 disaster north east of the city of Chongqing, the official Xinhua News Agency said. It said 27 of those were in a critical condition.

The government has blamed negligence among gas-drilling workers for the accident in which a well blew out and spewed a toxic mix of natural gas and hydrogen sulphide over the mountainous area. The well was sealed on December 27.

More than **9,000 people** were treated for injuries and more than **60,000 evacuated** from the area.

SHELL GAS EXPLOSION

LANDS HUNDREDS OF COMMUNITY PEOPLE IN HOSPITALS/CLINICS: IWHREKAN, UGHELLI SOUTH LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCIL, DELTA STATE

April 26, 2001

HIGHLIGHTS

- Shell's Gas explosion threatens the peace of Iwhrekan community.- Local population lives in constant fear.- Shell engages in hide and seek game over explosion.- Gaseous fume may engender refugee crisis in Iwhrekan Community.

ABOUT IWHREKAN COMMUNITY AND PEOPLE

Iwhrekan is an Urhobo Community in the Ughelli South Local Government Area of Delta State. The Community houses UTOROGU GAS PLANT; it also has 29 oil wells and, produces 270,000 barrels of crude oil per day. Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) is the sole operator of oil and gas facilities in the community.

"500 IN HOSPITAL OVER GAS LEAKAGE"

The above was the lead story of a local newspaper report over the Utorogu gas explosion (South - South, Thursday, April 26, 2001, page 1, volume 1. No. 239).

On April 19, 2001 at about 4.30 a.m., the community woke up that fateful morning and was threatened with a very loud noise which emanated from the Utorogu gas plant and subsequently, followed by gas rain. The incident lasted for about 2 weeks. The gas rain resulted into serious health impairment, which engendered an outbreak of epidemic in the area. Community activists told ERA that, over 500 persons are scattered in various hospitals/clinics outside the community receiving medical attention. The hospitals/clinics are the General Hospital and Shell Heath Center, all in Otujeremi in Ughelli South Local Government Area in Delta State. The following were reached on their sick beds during field trips:

Mr. Friday Ogbah Mr. Johnson Otaye Mrs. Esther Luwadure Mrs. Siaka Oghogho Mrs. Titi Onokere Miss Mercy Luwadare (2 yrs.) Old)

Top medical sources who pleaded anonymity and claimed to have treated some victims in an interview with ERA said the victims suffer from ailments such as sensation of the skull,

vomiting, diarrhoea and peppery feelings in the eyes associated with contact with dangerous substance. Nearby farmlands and streams were whitened by the pollution.

"WE ARE NOT AWARE OF ANY GAS EXPLOSION; GOOD DAY AND BYE"

When ERA visited the gas plant for Shell's comment on the incident an official who spoke to ERA on phone banged the phone on us screaming, "we are not aware of any gas explosion; good day and bye."

Mr. Johnson Otaye, the General Secretary of the Iwhrekan Community told ERA from his sick bed that, after the explosion occurred Shell held a closed door meeting with journalists in Warri City, Delta State over the explosion to ensure the under-reporting of the incident. Some of the community people who spoke, expressed their willingness to be relocated from the community if the opportunity is given the real option, because, the gas plant is located right inside the community and the threat it poses is enormous.

SHELL PIPELINE EXPLOSION

A huge clean up operation is underway in the Nigerian Delta State following a pipeline explosion. It is understood a Shell pipeline exploded near the town of Ughelli spilling oil onto nearby farmland. Nobody was injured in the incident but reports claim up to 1 m barrels of oil were spilled in to the countryside. This has been vigorously denied by Shell. It says the trunk line was immediately shut down after the alarm was raised. A Shell spokesman said a Joint Reaction team of trained experts was at the scene but the cause of the blast and an entire picture of the damage done is not yet known.

Reports said there were 10 storage tanks each capable of holding 50 barrels of oil and two Shell security officials guarding the burst pipe which, was still pouring oil into a deep hole made by the initial explosion. This is the latest in a long series of pipeline explosions that have claimed the lives of hundreds of people in the last few years.

Shell's Leaking Pipes

ERA FIELD REPORT #53

Subject: Shell's Leaking Pipes

From: Patrick Naagbantton

Dispatchline: Gana, Ughelli-North L.G.A., Delta State

Date: **January 12, 2000**

HIGHLIGHTS

Gas fire outbreak in sight
Death toll rises, Children and women victims

*When I die, know that Shell
killed me....
Master Jerome Atariku, 7
years*

*I find it difficult to move and
to breathe. Others have
relocated leaving only me. I
have no place to go. Tell
them [shell] to come and stop
this gas so that the cough
and itching will stop..
Mrs. Omodovwe Adjohowo,
97 years.*

*Anytime I come to this spot
[leaking pipeline] I have
problems with my respiratory
system and this is the only
route to my work place.
Mr. Osikekpe Samson, 36
years*

*We have heard and read that
shell.s staff are being held
hostage by our people
because of this explosion.
You [ERA Monitor] have
spent sometime here in our
community and you have
seen things for yourself. I
appeal that you go to the
world and say the truth, if you
do that God will be with you.
But [striking his chest and
weeping uncontrollably],
Shell has sinned against God
and our people, they have
told lies against us. Are we
violent as they say?*

Gospel Emueheri, 30 years

BACKGROUND

Gana is an old rural settlement of Urhobo ethnic nationality in Ughelli-North Local Government Area of Delta State. The people are predominantly farmers because of the available fertile land in the area. The population

of Gana is about 4,982 persons. Shell.s famous Eriemu oil field, 20 oil wells, network of facilities/ installations criss-cross the entire Gana community. Shell started operation in the place since 1958.

Gana community hosts the Gas project belonging to Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). All the above facilities are located inside the community.

GANA COMMUNITY, POLLUTED AND UNSAFE

On May 26, 1999, a major blowout occurred at Shell.s 16 inches truck line at Ikavwe bush and large quantity of crude oil spewed out. The affected area has vulnerable receptors like canals, swamps and open water bodies which aid the degrading effects of the spill. The following communities were heavily impacted.

1. Opherin community - Ughelli North LGA (Delta State)
2. Owevwe community . Ughelli North LGA (Delta State)
3. Onah community . Ughelli North LGA (Delta State)
4. Iyede community . Isoko North LGA (Delta State)
5. Emevor community . Isoko North LGA (Delta State)

The spill was not cleaned nor were compensation paid. Till the time of this report, the impact is still greatly felt in the affected areas.

On September 11, 1999, another major spill occurred at the Eriemu manifold situated in the community. The spill forced its way through a fragile valve (technical failure of Shell.s equipment). The spill was not attributed to sabotage but the spill was abandoned.

DEATH TOLL RISES, GAS FIRE OUTBREAK IMMINENT

May 13, 1999

Mr. Shedrach Oniyere, a 40 years old father of six children and Chairman of Gana community lamented to ERA that on May 13, 1999, a rupture occurred at the well 17 pipeline and spewed crude oil into the adjacent environment. The community said Shell only visited the community and did minor repairs on their aged pipeline leaving the environment devastated without any attention.

Consequently, another leakage occurred recently and spewed poisonous gas at the same well 17 pipeline that runs through Mrs. Omodovwe Adjohwo.s compound. ERA finding revealed that the leakage was caused by corrosion on the product pipeline.

The air in the community is charged with offensive odour and dangerous emissions from the affected site. This adverse atmospheric condition in the area has given rise to fears of impending epidemic in the area.

Unfortunately, the area has no health care facilities. The sanitary condition is very poor because of the polluted environment. The people are impoverished and suffer from poor nutrition. These factors are all conducive to disease vectors like cholera, dysentery, diarrhea and measles which has led to a high mortality rate in the community.

Late Mr. Joseph Ewuietoma (a 48 years old man with two wives and 11 children) who was an asthmatic patient and the spokesman of the community slumped and died while inspecting the spill site with some government officials and some community members.

Medical sources who pleaded anonymity disclosed to ERA monitor at the Shell cottage hospital at Ireke in Ethiope East LGA, of Delta State, that the man died as a result of inhaling an excess of poisonous fumes. Another victim Master Godstime Obior, a 6 years old boy who was also asthmatic died in his residence close to the site of the explosion for the same reason. The corpses of the two deceased persons are still in the mortuary.

The following Gana community members are in critical conditions from the same problem situation. They are in Ughelli and Agbara main town:

1. Master Odiri Shedrach - 1 year
2. Miss Anthonia Etaka - 5 years old
3. Miss Gift Power - 1 year
4. Miss Vwareua - 8 years
5. Master Freeborn Oteri - 8 years
6. Master Matthew Mukoro - 6 years
7. Mr. Paul Etarhienyo - 27 years old

APPEAL FOR RELOCATION

Gana community hosts SPDC and NNPC facilities. There are good access roads to the manifold, oil field, flare points, plants etc but Gana lacks all these amenities. There is constant electricity supply at Eriemu oil field, but Gana community remains in darkness. As many of the community people desert the affected area, a grave refugee problem is in sight.

There is also the fear of a possible gas explosion. Community people in an interview with ERA indicated their interest to resettle elsewhere if government provides an alternative place.

ERA RECOMMENDATIONS

- Shell should stop their gas leakage and dispatch a team of medical experts to the community to save lives
- Shell should pay compensation to the Gana people
- Government should re-settle the Gana people or relocate their old and ageing facilities

Explosion at Moomba gas plant Jan 2004

About 50 South Australian businesses were asked to shut down in the wake of an explosion and fire at the Moomba natural gas plant.

The explosion caused a fire at the Santos plant in SA's far north-east which took emergency crews about seven hours to control.

Investigators were trying to determine the cause of the fire, which started about 3am CDT. There were no injuries.

The liquid recovery section of the plant was shut down, prompting the state government to ensure domestic gas supplies by asking major users to shut down.

A Santos spokesman said engineers had flown to the gas field to assess the damage.

LONGFORD GAS EXPLOSION SEPTEMBER 1998

By Vanessa Hearman

MELBOURNE -- At the end of April, final submissions were presented to the royal commission into the gas explosion and fire at Esso's Longford facility in the Latrobe Valley. The Victorian Trades Hall Council has called on the state government to toughen its stance on occupational health and safety in the light of the evidence presented to the commission.

On community radio 3CR's *Stick Together Show* broadcast on April 30, VTHC secretary Leigh Hubbard told Meredith Butler that Esso is guilty of a "gross negligence" in its operations, and in its health and safety and management culture: "For example, [Esso management] did not implement the emergency response agreement with the Country Fire Authority."

Hubbard also strongly criticised the state government's failure to implement a safety regime for major hazard facilities like the Esso gas plant. "Some of the problems should have been picked up. The valve that went seriously wrong -- everyone knew it was malfunctioning -- was not taken out of the system and overhauled. Instead, Esso said it would just look at it again in 2005."

Hubbard pointed out that if inspectors had visited the site regularly, instead of plant managers being relied on, the fact that staff were not being trained to deal with catastrophic events would have been quickly apparent.

Andrew Hopkins, who also conducted an in-depth study of the 1986 Moura mine disaster in Queensland, also gave evidence to the commission. Hubbard said Hopkins' evidence was important because "he talked about management culture ... at Esso Longford you see boards up stating how many days it has been since a 'lost time injury' ... It is all focused on things that workers do, for example if they slip over, not on production-based major catastrophic events" which are the responsibility of management.

There were many similarities between the safety regimes at Moura and Longford, Hubbard noted. "It was eerie reading [Hopkins'] book on the Moura mine disaster because you could almost substitute the words 'Esso Longford' for 'BHP Moura'. The same string of system failures which happened there happened at Longford."

On the Victorian WorkCover Authority's plan to introduce in the next two years a new system to regulate major hazardous industries, Hubbard said that while VTHC is pleased that the government is finally implementing the national standard, "we have to wait to see the results because often the devil is in the detail. There are things we won't compromise on."

First, an operator of a major hazard facility must lodge a safety case with the [government] regulator outlining how it will cope if something goes wrong. Second, the safety case must be approved by the regulator, not simply received."

Coroner blames Esso for Longford Gas Explosion September 1998

November 15 2002
By Liz Gooch

The State Coroner today blamed oil giant Esso for the 1998 Longford gas disaster which killed two workers and cut the state's gas supply for about two weeks.

Mr Wilson, a maintenance superintendent and Mr Lowery, a maintenance supervisor, died on September 25, 1998 when a gas explosion shook the Longford plant as equipment couldn't handle the unusually high gas flow.

For two weeks after the blast, Victorian businesses and households struggled to operate without gas in a crisis which was estimated to cost gas users about \$1.3 billion.

Businesses were shut, workers were stood down without pay and emergency legislation was introduced to preserve the remaining gas.

In June 1999, a Royal Commission found that Esso's failure to adequately train workers in safety procedures caused the disaster and recommended that the company upgrade its training, safety monitoring and emergency procedures.

Esso, prosecuted by the Victorian Workcover Authority for 11 safety breaches.

In July last year, Esso was fined a record \$2 million in the Supreme Court after being found guilty of 11 charges under the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

After the verdict, 10,000 consumers and businesses who suffered financial loss during the gas shortage sued Esso in the Federal Court.

Eighteen Esso workers and their families also mounted a class action against the company in the Supreme Court. In a separate case, the Insurance Council of Australia sued Esso on behalf of 120 large businesses that lost production or had shut down during the gas crisis.

The World Today Archive - Thursday, 28 June, 2001 00:00:00

Reporter: Luisa Saccotelli

ELEANOR HALL: Well to a new development in the court case against the giant petroleum company, Esso.

The case was brought after the deadly explosion at Esso's Longford Plant in eastern Victoria nearly three years ago which killed two people.

Late this morning a jury in the Supreme Court in Melbourne found Esso guilty on 11 charges, as Luisa Saccotelli reports.

LUISA SACCOTELLI: The explosion at Esso's Longford Plant back in September 1998 cut gas supplies to more than a million homes and businesses for two weeks.

Two long-standing maintenance employees, Peter Wilson, and John Lowery were killed and eight others seriously injured. Piled on to that were business losses upwards of \$1 billion.

Eyewitnesses painted a horrific picture of blazing fireballs and men walking around dazed and blackened after the blast.

A seven months royal commission savaged Esso for failing to properly train and supervise its workforce and for failing in its fundamental duty of care to provide a safe workplace.

The sequel to the royal commission has just been played out. A Supreme Court trial of

Gas Explosion Rocks Umtata

Posted Fri, 19 Sep 2003

A welding gas cylinder which exploded in Umtata on Thursday injured a child, demolished a house and four cars and also damaged at least 97 houses in a two-kilometre radius.

A Ngqeleni messenger of the court, Ndumiso Maqokolo, said that during the afternoon he was doing a welding job on one of the vehicles next to the main gate of his house.

A few hours later he left the area and walked towards his house when he heard a loud blast when only a **19kg** cylinder exploded.

Illinois Gas Plant Explosion Forces Area Evacuation

November 14, 1998
Web posted at: 3:32 p.m. EST (2032 GMT)

[FISHER, Illinois](#) (CNN) -- Officials say a fire at a natural gas plant in east-central Illinois is out after an explosion Saturday morning that required a nearby neighborhood to be evacuated.

Flames shot 400 feet in the air when a gas main exploded, said Steve Zehr for the Sangamon Valley Fire Protection District.

Fire officials say they had the blaze under control quickly.

But people who live within a one-mile radius of the People's Gas plant still have not been allowed to return to their homes. Zehr estimated about six homes were evacuated.

No injuries were reported. The explosion occurred in a gas storage well, Zehr said.

The plant is located near the town of Fisher, about 100 miles south of Chicago.